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THE EXPORT INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
PROGRAM OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT
BANK
HARmSON S. HowEs*
The foreign commerce of the United States of America
today is infinitely more than the business of commercial
interchange with other nations. It is a force in world
affairs, reaching out to touch and in some degree to in-
fluence the attitudes of nations and the lives of men
throughout the world.1
Exports and imports in United States foreign trade currently
account for between six and eight percent of the gross national
product, the smallest proportion for any free world industrial coun-
try. It is misleading, however, to consider the relationship of foreign
commerce to the American economy in only these terms. In terms
of overall amount, the international trade of the United States is
greater than that of any other nation in the world. The United
States is the largest industrial and agricultural producer in the
world, and for many segments of the national economy, foreign
markets are not merely important but crucial.
Since the end of the post-war reconstruction era exporters in
all major industrial countries have been under constant pressure
to grant more liberal trade credits to customers abroad, especially
in those underdeveloped countries where balance of payment prob-
lems prevent the most favorable financial conditions.2 Since these
countries suffer from chronic adverse balance of payments which
require an extension of credit in the form of deferred payment
terms, exporters, banks or other financial institutions have not been
able to assume the risks inherent in the extension of such credit. All
credit transactions involve an element of risk and this risk increases
in proportion to the length of time the credit is granted.
*A.B., 1950 University of Miami, LL.B., 1957, Georgetown University, LL.M., 1965,
George Washington University.
1. Senate Comm. on Commerce Final Rep., The United States and World Trade:
Challenges and Opportunities, 87th bong., 1st Sess. xvii (1961).
2. Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Interim Rep., April 1960,
Measures to Expand U. S. Exports: Present Export Credit Facilities and Proposals forNew Mechanisms, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 276,277, Ehereinafter cited as April 1960 Senate
Hearings].
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In exporting abroad, especially to underdeveloped countries,
commercial risks are only part of the problem encountered by the
seller. An ever growing reality has been the increase of political,
economic and social change within these countries, accompanied
by an increasing array of non-commercial risks, such as expropri-
ation without compensation, the violations of concessions or agree-
ments, restrictions as to foreign exchange, or import restrictions.
More subtle but of equal importance are the various forms of
"creeping expropriation" employed by foreign governments to inter-
fere with business operations, such as the refusal or delay of resi-
dence and labor permits for American personnel, the withholding
of import permits, discriminatory taxes against foreigners and profit
restriction. In addition, though governments in underdeveloped coun-
tries assume a greater role in business operations, they are
frequently not capable of forming and implementing the sound
economic policies necessary to attract and protect foreign trade
and development. In industrialized countries where most of the
foreign trade is undertaken by United States interests, these non-
commercial risks are not a significant factor. In the underdeveloped
countries, however, where the need is greatest for increased trade
and investment, such problems have the effect of discouraging the
participation of United States businessmen considered desirable both
by the United States government and the various local governments
concerned.3
For the past several years there has been a growing concern
that the growth rate of the United States economy was being in-
hibited, in part, because of the increasing balance of payments
deficit caused not so much by a declining rate of exports as by
the increased expenditures abroad for military and economic assis-
tance to allied and nonaligned nations. This resulted in pressure
upon the United States dollar in the world market. President
Kennedy expressed concern at this trend immediately on assuming
office.
The gold outflow of the past three years has dramatically
focused world attention on a fundamental change that has
been occurring in the economic position of the United
States. Our balance of payments-the accounting which
shows the result of all, our trade and financial relations
with the outside world-has become one of the key factors
in our e c o n o m i c life. Mainly because that balance of
payments has been in deficit we have lost gold.
The loss of gold is naturally important to us, but it
also concerns the whole free world. For we are the principle
3. Pugh, Legal Protections of International Transactions Against Non-Commercial
Risks, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 301-306 (Surrey &
Shaw 1963); WHrrMAN, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAM AND PRIVATE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 9-12.
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banker of the free world and any potential weakness in our
dollar spells trouble, not only for us but also for our friends
and allies who rely on the dollar to finance a substantial
portion of our trade. We must therefore manage our balance
of payments in accordance with our responsibilities. This
means that the United States must in the decades ahead,
much more than at any time in the past, take its balance
of payments into account when formulating its economic
policies and conducting its economic affairs.
In seeking over-all equilibrium we must place maximum
emphasis on expanding our exports. . . . [t]he government
must play a more vigorous part in helping to enlarge
foreign markets for American goods and services.4
The problem of increasing exports in the face of growing non-
commercial risks in underdeveloped countries presented a problem
to United States foreign traders, in view of the lack of adequate
legal safeguards available for their protection. This paper reviews
the export credit insurance and guaranty programs administered
by the Export-Import Bank of Washington together with the Foreign
Credit Insurance Association, and various commercial banking
institutions.
To a limited extent existing legal and political systems in
countries to which exports are made may offer some protection to
property and contractual rights of the exporter. Valid and effective
protections are limited, however, by the economies in most under-
developed countries. When exports are purchased by an individual
buyer which involve payment in installments over a substantial
period of time, local law may provide some provision for compen-
sation if the goods are seized before title has passed to the buyer
and before payment in full has been made. Also, some assurances
may be granted by the exchange control authorities with respect
to the availability and transferability of the foreign exchange
required to make the installment payments. Any further protection
is likely to be limited in scope. Moreover, even if local law affords
protection, effective enforcement of these rights before the appro-
priate court, tribunal or agency may prove difficult. 5
Accordingly, in the last twenty years the United States has
negotiated a number of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce
and navigation with the purpose of protecting and encouraging
foreign investment and commerce abroad.6 These treaties provide
generally that nationals of each contracting country may freely
enter into business and receive nondiscriminatory treatment in the
4. Balance of Payments and Gold, Special Presidential Message to Congress, 107 CONG.
REC. 1705, Feb. 6, 1961.
5. Pugh supra note 3, at 304-306, 310-311; RuBrNi, PRrVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC REALITIES 82 (1962).
6. Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805, 806; Ru~in op. cit. &upra note 5, at I6.
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other contracting country in accordance with the status enjoyed by
nationals of the other contracting country. Foreign nationals are
also freed from restrictions regarding ownership and management,
receive assurances of convertibility of earnings and capital, and
in the event of expropriation, are promised prompt and adequate
compensation. The treaties guarantee the products of export of each
contracting country most-favored-nation treatment as to customs
duties and other charges that may be imposed, and subject them
to all related rules and formalities. Once the goods are in the
foreign country, they are guaranteed national treatment as to sale,
distribution, international taxation, storage and use. The foreign
exporter also gains the right to have access to local courts and
tribunals for ordinary commercial claims, and protection against
arbitrary imposition of exchange controls, but each country retains
the right to impose controls on imports or exports which have the
effect of imposing exchange restrictions.
Perhaps the area of greatest contention and sensitivity between
the have and have-not nations is that of expropriation or nationali-
zation.7 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme
Court of the United States stated:
There are few if any issues in international law today
on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations
on a State's power to expropriate the property of aliens.
There is, of course, authority, in international judicial and
arbitral decisions, in the expressions of national govern-
ments, and among commentators for the view that a taking
is improper under international law if it is not for a public
purpose, is discriminatory, or is without provision for prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation. However, Communist
countries, although they have in fact provided a degree of
compensation after diplomatic efforts, commonly recognize
no obligation on the part of the taking country. Certain
representatives of the newly independent and under-developed
countries have questioned whether rules of state responsi-
bility toward aliens can bind nations that have not consented
to them and it is argued that the traditionally articulated
standards governing expropriation of property reflect "im-
perialist" interests and are inappropriate to the circum-
stances of emergent states.
The disagreement as to relevant international law
standards reflects an even more basic divergence between
the national interests of capital importing and capital ex-
7. The terms "expropriation" and "nationalization" have sometimes been considered
to have different connotations. The term expropriate is sometimes applied to measures
taken in individual cases, while the term nationalization is often used for takings resulting
from a change in the economic and social structure of a state. It is now generally held,
however, that from a doctrinal viewpoint the distinction between the terms may have
little practical significance in the reality of international legal relations, and the more
general term of "taking of property" may well be preferable. Domke, Foreign Nationali-
zations: So-me Aspects of Contemporary International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L 585, 588.
8. 376 U.S. 898 (1964).
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porting nations and between the social ideologies of those
countries that favor state control of a considerable portion
of the means of production and those that adhere to a free
enterprise system. It is difficult to imagine the courts of
this country embarking on adjudication in an area which
touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals
of the various members of the community of nations. 9
While it is true that the treaties provide some standard for arriving
at the responsibility of the taking state, under most of the treaties
the compensation provisions are impaired by the exchange pro-
visions under which a state is required to make "reasonable pro-
vision" for the withdrawal in foreign exchange of compensation
for expropriated property only after providing for goods and
services essential for the health and welfare of its people. More-
over, in a case of general expropriation the taking country would
almost always find it difficult or impossible to make payment in
dollars.
The extent to which these treaties provide protection against
so-called "creeping expropriation" such as wage and labor controls,
price controls, import and export restrictions, or confiscatory tax-
ation is also questionable. Specific safeguards incorporated into a
treaty can always be circumvented by the harassment and per-
secution of an unfriendly government. Without a mutual recognition
of the benefits of trade between the countries, the point at which
legitimate regulation ceases, and becomes a "taking" is essentially
unanswerable. As a result, in recent years creeping expropriation
has become more feared than the outright variety.10
The treaties provide for national or most-favored-nation treat-
ment with respect to payments, remittances and transfers of funds
or financial institutions between the contracting countries. They also
provide that neither party shall impose exchange restrictions, but
nearly all permit the suspension of convertibility under certain
conditions to the extent necessary to prevent the monetary reserves
from falling to a new level, to effect an increase in the reserves
in order to bring them up to an adequate level, or both. In the
event restrictions are imposed pursuant to the escape clause, pro-
vision is made that the country concerned shall, after providing
whatever may be necessary to assure the availability of foreign
exchange for goods and services essential to the health and welfare
of its people, make reasonable provision for the withdrawal in
the currency of the other party of compensation for expropriated
property, earnings and capital. Although these provisions limit to
some extent the sovereignty of the restricting country, the scope
9. Id. at 428-430.
10. WHITMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 14, 15.
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and flexibility of the exceptions are sufficiently vague and open
to abuse so as to give little assurance to the foreign businessman.11
Another factor which causes concern in the context of the
political instability of many underdeveloped areas is that "risks
of confiscation or seizure cannot be fully eliminated through treaties
so long as the possibility exists of a change in government in the
foreign country through revolution or war." 12 Although this problem
has always existed it becomes more significant in the area of
politically unstable countries where a faction which succeeds to
power may not concede the rights of a foreign property owner
at all, and moreover, may gain much political support by repudiating
such treaties.' s
Each of the treaties contains a provision stating that nothing
in the treaty shall preclude the application of measures necessary
to protect its essential security interests, but the construction of
the phrase "security interests" might include internal or economic
security and so the possibility exists that this could be the basis
of wholesale rejection of the treaty obligations.1' Moreover, in view
of the scope and flexibility of the permitted exceptions, and the
broad and often ambiguous phraseology of the treaty protections,
the failure of the treaties to include any provisions guarding against
creeping expropriation or to provide for the failure of a state to
fulfill contractual or other undertakings, the treaties offer only
limited measures of effective legal protection. 5 These limitations
reflect a fundamental difference of approach between the United
States and underdeveloped countries. The United States investor
and exporter requires more in the way of safeguards than the
politicians in underdeveloped countries can promise without losing
the support of their electorates. Consequently, the fact that these
treaties can reflect only existing points of view results in what has
been suggested in an unfortunate paradox. That is, that where the
treaty assurances are meaningful they would probably not be neces-
sary, and where they are necessary they either cannot be negoti-
ated or, if they can be, often result in a document which satisfies
neither side and, if anything, only increases the aura of resentment
and mistrust so fatal to effective business relationships.10
Up to 1962 the United States had negotiated only seven of these
treaties with underdeveloped countries which were ratified by both
contracting countries. 7 Even if it can be assumed that the American
11. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 218 (1962).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POINT FouR 73 (1950).
13. WIIrTMAN, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 15.
14. Report by the Am. Bar Ass'n. Committee on International Trade and Investment
Section of International and Comparative Law, The Protection of Private Properti In-
vested Abroad 56 (1963).
15. Pugh, supra note 3, at 330.
16. WurrnmAN, op. cit. aupra note 3 at 15.
17. Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Korea, Fuscat and Oman, Nicaragua, Pakistan, FATOUROS,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 97.
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exporter can expect a degree of protection from these seven coun-
tries, the remaining areas where no treaty protection exists present
considerable potential danger.
Customary international law offers little protection for the alien
exporter contracting with a private party or autonomous govern-
ment agency.
During the nineteenth century and until the end of the Second
World War, it was generally held in international legal theory that
the right to nationalize or expropriate property was founded upon
the duty of a sovereign to make prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. 18 As the Supreme Court points out, in Banco Nacional,
this standard is no longer respectable. And this is especially true
in view of the position assumed by the Soviet Union and other
Socialist oriented states.,9
Although it is recognized that a sovereign has the right to
dispose of natural resources and other assets located in its territory,
notwithstanding that such property may belong to foreign nationals,
this principle is sometimes qualified to the extent that such property
must be taken for a public purpose or in the public interest.
20 It
has become increasingly difficult, however, to limit what a state
may consider necessary for the general welfare or benefit, the
requirements of sound welfare, or a public need in the national
economy. An international authority or another state would not be
competent in almost every instance to pass judgment on the ade-
quacy of such a purpose.
21
The act of nationalization by a sovereign state involves two
elements, (1) the act of taking, and (2) the act of making compen-
sation or the failure so to act. Although there arises an issue of
illegality in connection with the element of compensation, the taking
itself cannot be considered a violation of international law. This,
as the Supreme Court points out, is because of the principle that
the only recognized limits on the sovereign's right to nationalize
are those imposed in a treaty obligation.22 It has been suggested
that it is doubtful whether under customary international law a
state is obliged to pay compensation for property nationalized even
in so far as the nationalization may affect title to the property of
aliens. 23 Under the international law a state has no duty towards the
owners of nationalized property, but only towards the state of their
nationality, and then only if and when the state chooses to assert
18. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1959).
19. Dawson and Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of
Compensation? 30 FOlHAM L. REV. 727, 740-749 (1962).
20. DoInke, supra note 7, at 590, n. 58.
21. Id. at 591.
22. 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (1943); Domke, supra note 7,
at 585.
23. Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts-a Reply, 54
AM. J. INT'L L. 801, 804 (1960).
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its own rights flowing from these duties.u Since a state may either
expressly or by implication, wholly or partially, waive its claims
against another state for compensation arising from the nationali-
zation of its national's property, a nationalization of the property of
aliens is not, under international law, invalid per se.2 5
The Supreme Court recognized this difficulty in Banco Nacional
when it said:
Respondents contend that, even if there is not agreement
regarding general standards for determining the validity
of expropriations, the a 11 e g e d combination of retaliation,
discrimination, and inadequate compensation makes it pat-
ently clear that this particular expropriation was in violation
of international law. If this view is accurate, it would still
be unwise for the courts so to determine. Such a decision
now would require the drawing of more difficult lines in
subsequent cases and these would involve the possibility of
conflict with the Executive view. Even if the courts avoided
this course, either by presuming the validity of an act of
state whenever the international law standard was thought
unclear or by following the State Department declaration
in such a situation, the very expression of judicial uncer-
tainty might provide embarrassment to the Executive
Branch.
Another serious consequence of the exception pressed
by respondents would be to render uncertain titles in foreign
commerce, with the possible consequence of altering the
flow of international trade. If the attitude of the United
States were unclear, one buying expropriated goods would not
know if he could safely import them into this country. Even
were takings known to be invalid, one would have difficulty
determining after goods had changed hands several times
whether the particular articles in question were the product
of an ineffective state act.
2
Also, in the areas of creeping expropriation such as taxation,
exchange control, currency control and measures involving the
exercise of police power, the sovereign may exercise broad freedom
in altering the contractual relations between aliens and local entities.
International law provides little or no protection against such gov-
ernmental measures.
27
There has long been a concern with these problems among
industrialized countries which have recognized the importance of
international trade in their economic well-being. In order to encour-
age these exports to the underdeveloped countries, national govern-
ments have initiated government sponsored and supported systems
24. BISHOP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 627 (1962).
25. Baade, supra note 23, at 804.
26. 376 U.S. 398, 433-434 (1964).
27. Metzger, Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of Private Foreign Invest-
ments, 9 J. PuB. L. 133, 136 (1960).
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of export credits, export guaranties or credit insurance. As compe-
tition among the countries increased, there developed competition
over the terms of payment which were influenced in turn by how
far each government has been prepared to go in providing support
to the exporter in the form of credits, guarantees, or insurance.28
Today, some form of export credit insurance is being written in
some 30 countries.
Export Credit Insurance is considered vital by many
countries dependent on foreign trade and has become an
important instrument of their commercial policy. Exports
generally represent between 15 and 20 percent of the na-
tional income in the Western European countries where
export credit insurance was initially developed. This propor-
tion rises to around 30 percent in the Belgium-Luxembourg
Union and around 40 percent in the Netherlands. In Japan,
exports represents about 15 percent of the national income.
The availability of export credit insurance has undoubt-
edly had an important role in the expansion of exports in
the post-war period. Between 1951 and 1961, the value of
exports increased by 81 percent in Western Europe. The
increase reached 146 percent in Austria, 42 percent in the
Belgium-Luxembourg Union, 68 percent in France, 229 per-
cent in Germany (Federal Republic), 121 percent in Italy,
106 percent in the Netherlands, 74 percent in Switzerland
and 38 percent in the United Kingdom. Japan's exports
rose by 200 percent in the same period."
The Program of the Export-Import Bank
The Export-Import Bank of Washington (hereafter Eximbank)
was established in 1934 as a banking corporation under the laws
of the District of Columbia. The original purpose of the Bank was
to finance the expected increase in trade between the United States
and the Soviet Union following the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the two countries, but because of the failure of
Russia to discuss the outstanding debts in the United States, no
loans for trade with the Soviet Union were ever made by the Bank.
The emphasis of the Bank was then changed to that of financing
United States trade and it has developed to become the principal
instrument of the United States government in assistance and fi-
nancing of the export trade of this country. 0
The operations of the Bank are designed to support and
encourage the export and import trade of the United States, and
28. See Surrey and Goekijan, The Role of Export Credits, Gnaratfis ond Insitrarce
In International Trade, INTERNATIONAL FINANCING ANT INVESTMENT 377 (McDantels ed.
1963) for a history of foreign export guaranty programs and a summary of the provisions
of their respective programs.
29. Committee for Industrial Development of the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, Survey Rep. (1963).
30. Middleton, Export-Import Bank, LAWYERS GUTIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 391 (Surrey & Shaw 1963); LooMIs, PUsLic MONEY SOURCES FOR OVERSEAS
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 17 (1968).
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not to promote the economic development of less developed foreign
countries, as such. Although the Bank makes loans for specific
development projects, the purpose behind such long-term financing
is the development of the export trade of the United States. By
contrast, the Agency for International Development has as its pri-
mary purpose the furthering of economic and social development
of underdeveloped countries, and AID has no program for financing,
fostering or assisting directly in the import or export activities of
individuals or institutions of the United States, but does administer
a program of investment guaranties. 1
The Eximbank was completely revised by the Export-Import
Bank Act of 1945, 82 and it is operating today under this Act, as
amended. In 1953 the Committee on Banking and Currency of the
Senate conducted an extensive study of the Bank's operations,
particularly in Latin America, which resulted in the Export-Import
Bank Act Amendments of 1954, which further reorganized the Bank.83
On May 21, 1953, the Act was amended to include subsection (c)
of paragraph 2 which authorized the Bank to provide insurance
for United States exports against certain kinds of political risks."4
Under this authority, however, the Bank failed to develop any
extensive or effective program of guaranties or insurance. In 1955,
25 comprehensive guarantees were issued covering export trans-
actions in the amount of $8.8 million. In 1956, two were issued cover-
ing only $259,000. The Bank issued one guarantee against political
risk under this section, in 1955, in the amount of $875,000, and this
was subsequently cancelled. Exports of cotton and other agri-
cultural products were financed by the Bank under comprehensive
guarantees from 1955 to 1957. No further guarantees were issued
in 1958 or 1959.
8 5
During this time Congress began to receive complaints that
more and more business was being lost by American exporters
because of the highly competitive foreign markets. These complaints
emphasized that Western European and Japanese concerns were
able to offer credit terms superior to those of United States firms
because of the government backed insurance plans in force in
those countries, which not only offered guarantees against com-
mercial risks but, more important, insured against political risks
as well. In order to compete with these foreign firms United States
exporters had to offer payment terms which were equally attractive.
To do so the domestic exporter had to have financing, but because
31. See Clubb and Vance, Incentives to Private U.S. Investment Abroad Under the
Foreign Assistance Program, 72 YALE L.J. 475 (1963); Miller, Protection of U.S. Invest-
ments Abroad: The Investment (t7varantee Program of the United States Government, 32
Gao. WASH. L. REv. 288 (1963); WHITMAN, OP. cit. supra note 3.
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 635-635 (h) (1945).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (a) (1954).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1953).
35. AprZ 1960 Senate Hearings 278.
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of the risks involved, particularly those political risks peculiar to
the export trade, banks were disinclined to accommodate him.
In 1956, S. 2256 was introduced in the Senate with the purpose
of amending the Eximbank statute to provide for guarantees of
exports "against certain risks of a political nature." Officials of
Eximbank were not enthusiastic about the bill since they maintained
that (1) such guarantees were not necessary and (2) Eximbank
already had authority to provide protection against such risks,
particularly on a medium-term basis. As for short-term guarantees,
Mr. Samuel C. Waugh, Eximbank's president and Chairman of the
Board of Directors stated:
Experience has shown that political or transfer difficulties
seriously affecting international payments can generally be
foreseen as much as 180 days in advance.... If the insurance
is to be available only for shipments to safe areas . . . it
would be of little value to the exporter."
The bill died, but the clamor of exporters continued. In 1958,
S. 3149 was introduced in the Senate in another attempt to provide
export insurance guarantees. Eximbank officials again expressed
the opinion that such a program was unnecessary. Mr. Hawthorne
Arey, an official of Eximbank, explained the Bank's position as
follows:
[O]ur participation with the individual exporter in
purchasing from him on individual transactions a percentage
of his paper without recourse gives him all of the coverage
that any foreign insurer gives to its exporters. We have
that program, which is entirely distinct from this insurance
that I was speaking of, and which to my knowledge is not
offered by any other country. . . . After it becomes a sale
to the foreign buyer, we are prepared, and we have been
throughout the life of the bank to participate with the ex-
porter by purchasing some of his paper without recourse.
We obtain exactly the same end that is obtained through
the sale of exporter credit insurance. We have covered
everything. We have taken the paper off his hands.87
Mr. Waugh then added:
. . . but we class these as loans along with our other
credits because we take the paper of the foreign buyer off
the hands of our exporter."
The" confusion in the discussions between members of Eximbank
36. Hearings on S. 2256, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 41 (1956).
37. Hearing8 on S. 31409, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong.. 2nd
Sess. 19 (1958).
38. Ibd,.
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and members of Congress appears to have resulted from a failure
to distinguish clearly between the concepts of export credit or
financing, and export guarantees which are essentially a form of
insurance. Bank officials reasoned that their practice of nonrecourse
purchases in effect performed the same function as a guaranty or
an insurance policy. The two functions of financing and insurance
are separately performed in practice, however. Commercial banks
are concerned with the extension of loans at prescribed interest
rates to individual borrowers in specific cases. Insurance, on the
other hand, protects the insured against loss from any one of a
variety of causes in return for a premium calculated on an actuarial
basis to absorb the losses of a few out of fees paid by the many.
This basic difference in purpose and approach makes for a basic
difference between banks and insurance companies in point of view
and administration, and suggests the reason for the confusion in
the discussions regarding the need for export guarantees. Eximbank
by its practice of nonrecourse financing removed the risks from
those transactions in which it participated. But what of the exporter
who either wished to provide his own financing through his own
bank, or was in a position to finance his transactions himself? For
him insurance remained a necessity if he were to compete success-
fully in the foreign market.
As a result of the failure to pass S. 3249 and the growing demand
for more effective guarantees for United States exports, the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on
this phase of the Bank's activity.39 Testimony at these hearings
reiterated that United States firms were consistently losing business
in the highly competitive foreign markets because they were unable
to compete with the credit terms offered by foreign concerns whose
exports were insured by government or government-backed insti-
tutions. It was found that many American exporters, particularly
in the medium and smaller size categories, felt that this factor
was the principal competitive disadvantage with which they were
faced.
40
In May of 1960 the Bank embarked upon a program of short-
term guarantees against political risks, which provided that a
U.S. exporter could guarantee with the Bank 90 per cent of any
losses he suffered on credits of 180 days or less as a result of
nonconvertibility of foreign currencies, foreign government laws
preventing delivery of goods, cancellation of the foreign buyer's
import license, war, hostilities, rebellion, civil commotion, or expro-
priation of the exported goods. These guarantees could be purchased
directly from Eximbank or from 149 banks and insurance companies
39. April 1960 Senate Hearings.
40. Id. at 276.
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which agreed to serve as agents. The fees ranged from 25 cents
per $100 of invoice value for 30 day credit service, to 50 cents
where the credit term was between 151 and 180 days.
The Bank also provided at this time two "medium-term"
guarantee programs (from 180 days to five years, or seven years
in the case of jet aircraft) consisting of (1) a political risk guaranty
similar to that available on short-term transactions, guarantying
90 per cent of losses, with a premium of about three-fourths of 1
per cent per annum on the declining balances guaranteed; and (2)
comprehensive coverage costing 1.5 per cent per annum on the
declining balance. The Bank, between March and December 1960,
approved 109 short-term guarantees, including the participation of
32 commercial banks. In the first 11 months of 1960, 245 medium-
term credits or guarantees were written by the Bank.41
In his State of the Union message on January 30, 1961, concerned
with the overall unfavorable balance of payments situation in the
country, President Kennedy promised an immediate program con-
sisting of:
A series of executive orders, legislative remedies, and
cooperative efforts with our allies will get underway im-
mediately, aimed at attracting foreign investment and travel
to this country, promoting American exports, at stable
prices and with more liberal governmental guarantees and
financing . . . to provide for the common defense of the
free world and the hopes for growth of the less developed
lands.
On February 6, 1961, in his message to Congress on "U.S. Balance
of Payments and Gold Outflow from the United States" the President
went into further detail:
Our Export-Import Bank must play an increasingly
important role in our export promotion efforts. Last year
the Export-Import Bank announced a widening of the facili-
ties which it offers for extending credit to American
exporters. Despite the improvements made, these facilities
are not yet adequate, nor are they comparable to those
offered by foreign countries, especially t h o s e offered to
small and medium-sized exporting concerns and those offered
for the financing of consumer goods. I am directing the
President of the Export-Import Bank, by April 1, to prepare
and submit to the Secretary of the Treasury, as Chairman
of the National Advisory Council of International Monetary
and Financial Problems, a new program under the Export-
Import Bank to place our exporters on a basis of full
equality with their competitors in other countries. Also, I
41. Senate Select Committee on Small Business on Encouragement and Expansion of
Exports by Small Business, Rep. No. 89, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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have asked the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate and
submit by the same date a study of methods through which
private financial institutions can participate more broadly
in providing export credit facilities.42
In September 1961, subsection (c) of section 2 of the act was
amended to permit the Bank to guarantee, insure, coinsure and re-
insure United States exporters doing business in the United States
against political and credit risks of loss arising in connection with
United States exports, and to issue such gurantees, insurance, etc.
to exporters, insurance companies, financial institutions, "or groups
thereof" and authorized the Bank to employ any of these instru-
ments as agents in the issuance and servicing of such guarantees,
insurance, etc. and the adjustment of claims arising thereunder."5
After a study by the Bank of the export credit insuring systems
abroad, it was decided that the President's directive could best be
implemented through an association of American insurance com-
panies associating with the Bank to provide protection against the
commercial credit and political risks to which exporters are exposed
when extended credit is offered. This partnership arrangement is
in accord with the policy of the Bank to employ private facilities
to the fullest extent possible. Furthermore, the commercial insur-
ance industry was unwilling to abdicate to the government its
responsibility to respond to a legtimate insurance market should
a feasible program be developed. The insurance industry also pro-
vided the existing machinery of agents and brokers on a national
scale necessary to service such a program.
On October 27, 1961, President Kennedy announced the formation
of the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA) which had an
original membership of fourteen companies to assist in this program
with the Bank. The program has grown to more than seventy stock
and mutual companies in 1964.44
In February, 1962, a program was instituted by the Bank, to be
administered by FCIA, in partnership with the Bank, which provided
that the commercial credit risks of FCIA policies were to be
shared equally by FCIA and the Bank and that the political risks
were to be borne entirely by the Bank. The first policies of insurance
were issued in February 1962. FCIA is a voluntary association of
insurance companies the function of which is to insure trade credits
granted by U.S. suppliers of products abroad who qualify as normal
risks. The insurance covers the exporter up to an agreed percentage
42. Message to Congress, supra note 4.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1961). Previous See. 2 (c) enacted by Public Law 30, 83rd Cong.
(67 Stat. 28), May 21, 1953, authorized Eximbank to issue certain consignment insurance
or reinsurance in favor of U.S. exporters up to an aggregate outstanding amount of
$100,000 00044. 0is, GuIDE TO IXPORT CREDIT INSURANCB 9 (1964); LOOMis, op. cit. supra note
30, at 21.
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against non-payment loss resulting from commercial credit and
political hazards, or both, as specified. Eximbank and the FCIA
jointly shared the commercial risk up to August 1, 1964, but as of
that date the insurance syndicate became the sole insurer of the
credit risk with Eximbank providing re-insurance to the insurance
companies over certain limits of liability. Eximbank has always
been the sole insurer of the political risks although policies are
written and administered by FCIA, and all servicing is carried out
by FCIA, as agent for the Bank and for the member insurance
companies.4
Under the FCIA-Eximbank program insurance is available to
any manufacturer or exporter who is a resident of and doing
business in the United States or its territories, including the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico.
Under the short-term policies products are eligible for insurance
if they are produced or manufactured in the United States to the
extent that at least one-half of their value, exclusive of price mark-up,
has been added by labor and material exclusively of U.S. origin.
Medium-term policies are designed to cover income-producing capital
goods, such as industrial, communications or transport machinery
and equipment, certain types of livestock and certain other items
provided they are produced or manufactured in the United States
and are customarily sold in international trade on payment terms
of 181 days to five years. Both short and medium term transactions
are eligible if they are to credit-worthy buyers in "friendly foreign
countries" within acceptable dollar limits which are customary
and justified by normal trade standards. Payment must be made
in U.S. dollars and shipment must be made from a U.S. port."8
The residence requirements for coverage include (1) an indi-
vidual resident of the United States, (2) a partnership resident in
the United States in which no partner is a "controlled foreign
corporation" (defined as one which is 50 per cent or more owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by United States interests),
(3) a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
United States or any state or territory thereof or the District of
Columbia, and (4) a foreign corporation doing business in the United
States which is not a "controlled foreign corporation" as defined.
While FCIA insurance is not available for exports of a "controlled
foreign corporation" it is available for shipments to such corporation
if the goods will be utilized in manufacture by the controlled foreign
corporation within the country of its incorporation, will be utilized
or consumed in the business of the controlled foreign corporation
within the country of its incorporation, or will be offered for resale
45. HoLms, id. at 19.
46. Ibid.
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for consumption within the country of its incorporation. In order
to obtain coverage the exporter need not be the manufacturer of
the goods exported. Merchants are eligible if they hold title to the
goods exported.'
7
Four basic types of policies, two short-term and two medium-
term, are available. Although the comprehensive short and medium-
term policies are the most widely used, the short and medium-
term political risk only policies are available for those willing to
assume all commercial credit risks themselves. The four policies
are:
1. Short-Term Comprehensive policies which cover both com-
mercial credit and political risks on sales of any product involving
payment terms up to 180 days.
2. Short-Term Political Risk policies which insure political
risks only, as defined, on sales of any type product on payment
terms up to 180 days.
3. Medium-Term Comprehensive policies cover both commer-
cial credit and political risks on sales of such items as machinery,
equipment, certain types of livestock and other products which
are normally sold in international trade on payment terms of 181
days to five years.
4. Medium-Term Political Risk policies cover political risks only
on the same type of product and payment terms as those covered
in medium-term comprehensive.4
8
The risks covered in all four policies are defined by the FCIA.
Commercial credit risks are defined as (1) the insolvency of the
buyer, or (2) the failure of the buyer to pay the insured within
six months after due date for products delivered to and accepted
by the buyer.49 The Political risks, for which coverage is provided
solely by Eximbank, are defined as (1) transfer risks, or the in-
ability to convert the buyer's local currency deposit in payment
of the insured obligation into dollars and to then transfer these
dollars into the United States; (2) the cancellation or non-renewal
of an export license or the imposition of restrictions on the export
of products not subject to license or restriction prior to the date
of shipment under circumstances not due to the fault of the buyer,
or the cancellation, under circumstances not due to the fault of
the buyer, of previously issued and valid authority to import such
shipment. Also covered is the prevention of the import of such
shipment into the buyer's country due to the imposition of any law
or any other order, decree or regulation having the force of law
47. LOOMIS, op. cit. aupra note 80, at 21, 22.
48. HoLLIS, op. cit. supra note 44, at 22, 23; LooMis, op. cit. supra note 30, at 24-26.
49. HoLLis, op. cit. supra note 44, at 20.
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under circumstances not due to the fault of the buyer. Coverage
is provided for (3) war, hostilities, civil war, rebellion, revolution,
insurrection, civil commotion or other like disturbance occurring
on or before the due date; (4) requistion, expropriation, confiscation
or intervention in the business of the buyer by a governmental
authority occurring on or before the due date; (5) the imposition
of any law or any order, decree or regulation having the force of
law which, under circumstances not due to the fault of the buyer,
prevents the buyer's local currency deposit, referred to in (1),
supra, from being made; and (6) transport or insurance charges
occasioned after shipment by interruption or diversion of voyage
outside the United States due to political causes and which charges
are impracticable to recover from the buyer. 50
The FCIA policy specifies the percentage of loss insured by
each type of coverage. For short-term comprehensive policies
political risks are covered for 95 per cent and commercial credit
risks are covered for 85 per cent. Short-term coverage for political
losses alone is 90 per cent. Medium-term comprehensive and political
coverage is for 85 per cent, however, in certain high risk countries
selected by FCIA the coverage on medium-term comprehensive
and political coverage is only 70 per cent.51
Certain risks are excluded from coverage. While each policy
specifies its applicable exclusions, in general losses are excluded
which are due to the fault of the exporter, are on any shipment
sold to a buyer for any currency other than U.S. dollars, arise
from unwillingness of the buyer to accept the products shipped, to
losses with respect to which a dispute exists with the buyer until
such dispute is settled to the satisfaction of the insurers, to any
risk arising out of the exchange fluctuations or devaluation of the
currency of the buyer's country occurring on or before the due
date of the indebtedness or the date of deposit, whichever is later,
and to any loss for which written claim is not made prior to the
expiration of one year from the due date of the indebtedness.
52
Each of the four policy coverages is subject to its individual
conditions. For either of the two short-term policies the exporter
must agree to a "whole turnover" requirement which provides that
the exporter agrees to insure all eligible shipments to all foreign
markets, although he may exclude all shipments to Canada and all
shipments paid for in advance or under an irrevocable letter of
credit. It may also be possible for other exclusions to be agreed
upon for individual countries or products provided the remaining
portion of sales offer FCIA acceptable volume and spread of risk.53
50. Id. at 201-21; LOOMiS, op. cit supra note 30, at 22, 23.
51. HOLLIS, Op. cit. supra note 44, at 24.
52. Id. at 23.
55. Id. at 17; LOOMiS, op. cit. supra note 30, at 24,
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Each of the medium-term policies is available on a case by
case basis. Coverage is sold on a single sale or a series of repetitive
sales to the same buyer during the ensuing twelve months. Repe-
titive medium-term sales coverage is primarily intended for the
manufacturer or exporter who has a distributorship or s i m il a r
arrangement with the buyer. By qualifying such buyer for credit,
a series of shipments within that annual credit limit may be insured."
On all medium-term policies a downpayment is required from the
buyer and the exporter is expected to retain a portion of the risk
for his own account. The usual downpayment is at least 20 per cent
but where the exporter can demonstrate that a foreign competitor
can offer terms based on a lesser downpayment, a 10 per cent
downpayment will be allowed. On the balance, or financed portion
retained by the seller, the FCIA or the Bank will insure 85 per cent
of the defined commercial or political risks, the exporter being
expected to retain 15 per cent for his own -account. Also, if the
exporter insures all his medium-term transactions on a "whole turn-
over" basis, he can secure coverage of 90 per cent of his political
risks and obtain a lesser premium fee. For the medium-term trans-
actions the financed portion retained by the exporter must be
evidenced in the form of a note issued and delivered to the exporter
by the buyer, in a form substantially conforming to note forms
available from the FCIA. 55
Each policy of the four issued normally provides that coverage
begins from the date of shipment, defined as the date when the
products are shipped en route to the buyer. Under either of the
policies, however, the exporter may for a small additional premium
elect to insure from the date of the contract of sale. This coverage
is intended to protect the exporter against loss on orders which
involve a preliminary period of manufacture or assembly such as
products designed to a customer's specifications. This coverage is
in the form of an endorsement to the regular policy. 56
Each of the FCIA policies may also be endorsed to cover trans-
actions on which title to the products is retained by the policy-
holder while the products are in a foreign warehouse or are on
consignment. Consignment coverage applies to current consignment
shipments and to consignment or warehouse stocks already in foreign
countries. Endorsement coverage is limited to political risks during
the period of consignment, the full terms of the coverage become
effective from the date of sale from the consignment stock and for
54. HoLms, op. cit. supra note 44, at 22; LooMis, op cit. supra note 30-, at 25.
55. HOLLIS, op. cit. supra note 44, at 22, 23; LooMis, op. cit. supra note 30, at 25.
56. Pre-shipment coverage is designed to protect the exporter against loss on orders
which involve a preliminary period of manufacture or assembly, especially on goods
tailored to the customer's specifications. Under the short-term policies, the exporter may
elect within ten days of the effective date of the contract to take pre-shipment cover
either on a specific contract or on all contracts and the endorsement provides that ship-
ments must be made within 180 days after the date of the contract. HOLLIS, op. cit. supra
note 44, at 22, 23.
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a period not to exceed 180 days. If consignment coverage is applied
for and approved a limit of coverage for each country applied
for is determined. Medium-term consignment endorsements for com-
prehensive and political risks only are also issued. The products
covered must qualify for medium-term insurance, a n d consign-
ment coverage is required when machinery, equipment or other
items are consigned to a warehouse or to the custody of a third
party for delivery to the exporter's distributor in order to replenish
existing stocks. As products are withdrawn a 20 per cent down-
payment is made and notes signed for the balance or financed
portion of the contract price. Preshipment or consignment endorse-
ments are subject to the same insured percentages as the policy
to which they relate, with the exception that in determining a loss
prior to shipment in an insured contract, the percentage is applied
to the contract price instead of the gross invoice value on short-
term and amount of default on a note under a medium-term policy.
All policies require the exporter to retain the uninsured percentage
at his own risk.
57
In addition to the insurance program Eximbank offers a pro-
gram of financial and guaranty assistance on medium-term export
transactions from 181 days to five years. Under this program the
exporter secures nonrecourse financing from his commercial bank
and the Eximbank issues its comprehensive commercial and politi-
cal risk guaranty on the transaction or takes a participation directly
in the financing along with the commercial bank, or the exporter.
The same persons, partnerships and corporations eligible for credit
insurance are eligible for financial and guaranty assistance on
medium-term transactions. The Eximbank will not provide assis-
tance for a transaction unless the exporter has offered credit to
a foreign buyer on terms which are "commercially customary in
international trade" and which provide for payment within 181
days to five years. The single exception involves the sale of large
jet aircraft, on which the Bank will permit a seven year period
of repayment. To demonstrate that the terms are "commercially
customary", the exporter will be expected to show that the terms
are in accordance with those common to accepted commercial prac-
tice by exporters in a number of countries, or that any terms which
appear long by this standard are being made available by foreign
financial institutions. While the Eximbank has no inflexible standard
applying to every product, it generally considers that financing of
raw materials and consumer goods should be offered on a less than
180 day basis making them ineligible for medium term assistance,
while financing for automobiles should be offered for no more than
57. HOLLIS, Op. Oit. supra note 44, at 33-25,
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18 months, agricultural machinery and light construction :equipment
for no more than three years, and financing for most heavy equip-
ment should not be for longer than five years. 58
Three types of participation are available from Eximbank. The
Eximbank will, when a commercial bank is willing to provide
financing on a nonrecourse basis, issue its guaranty to the commer-
cial bank covering the commercial risk on the later maturities
and the political risk on all maturities. This guaranty extends to the
financed portion. 59 Eximbank sets its fee for the guarantee in ac-
cordance with the credit terms being offered the buyer and the
country in which the buyer is located. The exporter deals only
with the commercial bank, which in turn conducts negotiation
with Eximbank.60
Where the commercial bank desires Eximbank to participate
with it in financing the transaction, Eximbank will consider an
arrangement whereby the commercial bank purchases the buyer's
notes from the exporter and then issues a participation certificate
to Eximbank covering the financing of the later maturities which
the Eximbank provides. Under this arrangement the commercial
bank takes the entire risk of non-payment, both commercial and
political, on the early maturities and Eximbank assumes the risks,
both commercial and political, on the later maturities. The exporter
receives nonrecourse financing as in the case of a guaranty."
If an exporter can show he has been refused financing by
at least two commercial banks or other institutions, and in addition
has been refused credit insurance from FCIA, Eximbank will con-
sider a direct application from an exporter for either a guaranty
or a direct participation in the financing. Under the FCIA insurance
now available, specific approval of both FCIA and Eximbank is
required before a policy will be issued. If an application for FCIA
insurance should be refused by the Bank, it is doubtful if the trans-
action would be considered favorably for either a participation or
a guaranty"2 .
Eximbank provides guarantees for U.S. enterprises s e I I I n g
technical services and engineering services abroad, and guarantees
are available for products shipped on a lease basis or on consign-
ment awaiting sale, or on products and goods on exhibit at trade
fairs. While these guarantees are for goods and related technical
services which originate or are manufactured in the United- States,
the Bank will not automatically disqualify an item manufactured
in the United States but which contains some foreign made com-
58. LooMis, op. cit. supra note 30, at 28.
59. The exporter will be required to retain for his own account not less than fifteen
percent of the invoice value remaining after the down payment by the purchaser.
60. Middleton, supra note 30, at 400, 401; Wrigley, How to Get Export Credit Insurance
Insurance or Guarantees, 71 INTI'L CommzncE 17-19 (1965).
61. LooMis, op. cit. supra note 30, at 29, 30; Wrigley, ibid; Middleton, supra note 30,
at 400, 401.
62. Loomis, op. cit. supra note 80, at 80; Wrigley, aupra note 60, at 18, 19.
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ponents. A determination of eligibility will be made on a case by
case basis.
It is the policy of the Bank to make its facilities available
for all goods which are legally exportable. Eximbank prefers to
assist in the export of newly manufactured goods but will also
consider used equipment, taking into consideration the condition of
such equipment, the extent it may have been rebuilt or reconditioned
and any warranties that may be placed upon it. Of particular
importance to the Bank is the method used for determining value
of this equipment.63
Both under the medium-term FCIA insurance policies and the
medium-term guarantees to commercial banks, sales of large com-
mercial jet aircraft are guaranteed on terms up to seven instead
of five years. These sales are usually offered through a take-out
arrangement with a commercial bank which provides the financing.
The Eximbank extends a direct credit to the purchaser, as with
a project credit, but requires a down payment and exporter
participation."
CONCLUSION
The program of Eximbank as only been in operation since
1962 and therefore it is difficult now to make a determination of its
effectiveness. In its first year of operation FCIA wrote policies
of insurance covering approximately $500 million in U.S. exports,
and had assisted in financing, through its bank guarantee program,
about $160 million in exports. 65 In the fiscal year ended June 30,
1964, FCIA insured approximately $744.5 million in exports, and
Eximbank guaranteed about $272 million in exports.66 Clearly, at
this point the anticipated increase in export commerce has not
materialized to a significant extent. This may be due to a number
of factors which were not sufficiently taken into consideration in
establishing the present program.
FCIA coverage on short-term transactions must be insured,
under the present system, on a whole turnover basis. Although
provision is made for waiving this requirement in respect to ship-
ments to Canada, or when a reasonable spread of the risk can
be shown, a problem may arise for the exporter in a competitive
market where a premium based on a whole turnover may make
the difference between overall success or failure. Underwriting ex-
perience will furnish the answer as to whether coverage can be
provided on a case by case basis for short-term transactions, but
63. MIDDLTON, supra note 30, at 401, 402.
64. Id. at 401; Wrigley, supra note 60, at 18, 19.
65. Wrigley, U.S. Exporters Non Offered Faster, More Flexible Credit Insurance:
or Guarantees, 69 INT'L COMMERCE 2 (1963).
66. Wrigley, 71 INT'L COMMEaCm 15 (1965).
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it would be desirable to conform short-term coverage, in so far
as possible, with medium-term standards.
On the other hand, with the e x c e p t i o n of jet aircraft, no
provision is made for insurance or guarantees in the case where
credit terms may be required for longer than five years. Some
foreign credit insurance programs provide coverage of more than
five years when it can be shown to be necessary to match the terms
of a foreign competitor. Although Eximbank provides some facilities
under its project loan activity to enable the financing of such a
project, the foreign customer himself must go to considerable
trouble and expense to obtain approval of the project, and after-
wards the U.S. exporter runs the risk of losing the business to
another U.S. competitor because of the length of time involved in
obtaining approval.
There is also an absence in the program of any provision for
insuring or extending guarantees to exports involving payment in
currencies other than U.S. dollars. It is true that one impetus
of the program was the concern with the balance of payments
position of the United States, but the increasing number of hard,
convertible currencies present opportunities to the U.S. exporter
which might well be taken advantage of if the guarantee program
could be extended to protect not only the exporter but also the
U.S. dollar position.
Down payment requirements could also be changed to be made
sufficiently flexible so that they could be applied differently to
each case. Insurance requirements limiting coverage should remain
fixed at a certain percentage, but the exporter could be allowed
to assume a greater portion of the risk if he finds this necessary to
compete in an individual case.
As experience is gained in the administration of the program,
improvements in the position of the U.S. exporter will undoubtedly
result. Close and continuous study not only of the United States
p r o g r a m, but of the operation and effect of foreign guarantee
systems should be undertaken with a view toward improving the
position of the individual U.S. exporter and the foreign trade position
of the United States as well.
